
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represents a victory for Hussain,		
According to	Ambassador Mallory, st	a-
bility in Jordan depends on "the r	• •	u
young man, without whom the cou		ome
a shambles!		

25X1

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25X1A

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25X1

25X1

25X1		
		SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON JORDAN
	25X1	
		The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 29 April on Jordan is chiefly a call for Arab cohesion against "imperialist intrigues" and an effort to encourage Syrian and Egyptian attempts to undermine King Hussain's position. A comparatively mild recapitulation of recent Soviet propaganda on Jordan, the statement avoids direct personal criticism of Hussain or the Hashim government.
		The declaration censures the Western powers, the "United States above all." It also singles out Israel and Iraq for criticism and reflects Moscow's concern over the possible disruption of the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian pact.
	25X1A	In conclusion, the Soviet Foreign Ministry warns of possible "dire consequences" and calls the dispatch of the US Sixth Fleet an "overt military demonstration against the Arab east which is further aggravating the situation." However, there is no suggestion of any specific Soviet counteraction.
	23X IA	

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25X1A

### 3. ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER INCIDENTS INCREASING

25X1A

Israeli armed forces are engaged in continuing provocative activity along the Syrian border, according to information from UN truce team personnel in Syria. On 26 April the third dangerous incident in two days occurred on the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias when the Israelis directed machine gun and 120-mm. mortar fire against a Syrian frontier post. UN

observers were endangered by fire from both sides; the Israelis, however, demonstrated an especially belligerent attitude toward UN personnel and refused to accept a message from the chief of the Israeli-Syrian mixed armistice commission telling them to stop provocative maneuvering.

25X1

Comment

Tension in the areas along the Israeli-Syrian border around Lake Tiberias and Lake Hula has increased considerably during the past month. The Syrian Foreign Ministry has expressed irritation with a report by the UN truce team that new bridge construction by the Israelis in the demilitarized zone south of Hula is presumably for civil purposes, and has threatened to take this issue to the UN Security Council.

A number of incidents have also occurred on the Israeli-Jordanian border, but the Israelis appear to be playing these down for the moment in line with their stated desire to do nothing to embarrass King Hussain's efforts to strengthen his position. There have been very few incidents of any significance along the Gaza strip border where the UNEF is participating in border patrols. General Burns, the UNEF commander, recently stated, however, that the Israelis are engaged in a systematic attempt to discredit UNEF despite the absence of any fedayeen terrorist activity.

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	4. POSITION OF KEY ANTILEFTIST OFFICERS IN	
	SYRIAN ARMY STRENGTHENED  25X1A	i
25X1A	Three antileftist Syrian army officers have been reassigned to more influential command positions in what seems to be the beginning of a second round of trans-	
25X1	fers to counter leftist influence in the army, General Daghestani reportedly has been moved to dual command of the Damascus and Qatana garrisons; Col. Bashir Tabaa to command of the brigade at Baniyas; and Col. Mahmud Shawkat to replace Daghestani at the Israeli front.	25X1 25X1
	These men are believed to be members of the "Damascene officers" group which supports Chief of Staff Nizam al-Din and President Quwatli against both the Sarraj and Nufuri officer factions. The transfer of Daghestani to command of both the Damascus and Qatana troops would strengthen the control of the chief of staff over them and, consequently, weaken proleftist influence. There have been previous reports that a second round of transfers was planned following the recent detente between the various factions. President Quwatli and Nizam al-Din may be taking advantage of the Jordanian situation to better their position inside Syria.	
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Indonesian officials are preparing for a 19-day visit by Kliment Voroshilov, titular head of the Soviet state, who will arrive in Indonesia on 6 May accompanied by a large delegation. Voroshilov's tour will be limited to areas of Indonesia which are under Djakarta's controlJava, Bali, and North Sumatra. A special committee is trying to match the variety of entertainment, mass meetings, and speeches which the Soviet Union lavished on President Sukarno last year.  Sukarno probably hopes Voroshilov's visit will popularize the Soviet Union in Indonesia and reduce resistance to the \$100,000,000 Soviet technical aid agreement which was signed in September 1956 but has never been submitted to the Indonesian parliament for ratification. The government has wished to avoid an acrimonious parliamentary debate and also has been unsure as to how to fit the \$100,000,000 into its development program with adequate safeguards. Sukarno and the central government, however, are now eager for additional funds to finance projects in the disaffected provinces and are therefore likely to be less wary about the terms on which they accept Soviet aid. There are also strong indications that the government may approach the United States for more aid.	by a large delegation. Voroshilov's tour will be limited to areas of Indonesia which are under Djakarta's controlJava, Bali, and North Sumatra. A special committee is trying to match the variety of entertainment, mass meetings, and speeches which the Soviet Union lavished on President Sukarno last year.  Sukarno probably hopes Voroshilov's visit will popularize the Soviet Union in Indonesia and reduce resistance to the \$100,000,000 Soviet technical aid agreement which was signed in September 1956 but has never been submitted to the Indonesian parliament for ratification. The government has wished to avoid an acrimonious parliamentary debate and also has been unsure as to how to fit the \$100,000,000 into its development program with adequate safeguards. Sukarno and the central government, however, are now eager for additional funds to finance projects in the disaffected provinces and are therefore likely to be less wary about the terms on which they accept Soviet aid. There are also strong indications that the		A PREPARING TO WELCOME VOROSHILOV	7 25X1A
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